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Abstract
New information and communication technologies, we argue, have been power-
biased: in many industries they have allowed rms to monitor workers more closely,
thus reducing the power of these workers. An e¢ ciency wage model shows that power-
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1 Introduction
A change in workplace technologies may a¤ect the relative earnings of workers in at least
two distinct ways. One is through the market for skill, the other through workerspower
in relation to their employers. Increases in earnings inequality since the late 1970s in many
industrial economies - and in particular, in liberal market economies like the US and UK
- have been explained by many economists as a consequence of skill-biased technological
change (SBTC). However, the evidence cited for SBTC can be read instead as evidence
that new technologies a¤ect the distribution of earnings not through supply and demand,
but through changes in the relative power of di¤erent groups of employees. The reasons for
these changes are detailed in Guy (2003) and the implications are analyzed more formally
by Guy and Skott (2005) and Skott and Guy (2007).
This paper explores the implications of power-biased technical change for the functional
distribution of income. Empirically, it is not just earnings inequality among workers that
has increased. There have also been signicant changes in the functional distribution of
income. In the US real wages have stagnated or fallen for most workers, and the share of
wages and salaries in GDP has fallen dramatically in both the US and many European
countries (e.g. De Long (2005), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000)). Over the same period
the remuneration of top managers has sky rocketed, and the decline in wages has been
associated with relatively weak productivity growth and an intensication of the work
process (Piketty and Saez (2003), Green (2004)).
Although our analytic framework is similar to theirs, our use of the "power" term
is slightly di¤erent than that of Bowles and Gintis (1990). In their usage, e¢ ciency
wage models like the one used here show the employer exercising power over the employee
through the payment of an employment rent, combined with the threat of dismissal (which
is a threat to withdraw the rent). However - in their model, as in ours - this rent depends
on the employees ability to a¤ect protability by varying e¤ort. We understand that
ability of the employee as representing power, as well. Thus, an employee has power, in
relation to the employer, because of the employees ability to a¤ect outcomes that matter
for the employer.
All jobs entail some power, according to this use of the term: an investment banker
makes investments which may make or lose millions for the bank, and a burger ipper
can burn a few batches of burgers; the di¤erence in degree is important, but in both cases
there is an agency problem with which the employer must reckon. Among the factors which
determine the employees power are the extent of the assets or operations concerning which
the employee makes decisions; the quality and timeliness of the employers information
about the employees actions; and the quality and timeliness of the employers information
about the situation in which the employee acts (the state of nature). Employers also have
power over their employees. With incomplete contracting for employee actions, employers
will typically want to pay a wage in excess of what their workers can expect if red. Thus,
the employers ability to re a worker (thereby reducing the workers utility) is a source of
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power to the employer. This paper considers technological change that a¤ects the balance
of power between workers and employers.
A large Marx-inspired literature has analyzed how rmschoice of technique can be
inuenced by considerations of power. Important contributions include, among others,
Marglin (1974) and Braverman (1974). Our paper is closely related, in particular, to
Bowles (1989) and Green (1988).
Quoting Marxs (1967, p. 436) statement that "it would be possible to write quite
a history of the inventions made since 1830, for the sole purpose of supplying capital
with weapons against the revolts of the working class", Bowles goes on to describe how
the pursuit of prot may lead capitalist rms to choose "capitalist technologies" that are
technically ine¢ cient but enable rms to reduce wages and/ or enforce an increase in
the intensity of work. A similar argument is presented by Green (1988), and both papers
contain some formal modeling to back up the argument. The modeling, however, is partial
and it is not carried very far. Thus, the main contribution of this paper is to reconsider
and rene ideas that have been around in the Marxian literature for a long time and to
relate these ideas to recent changes in information and communication technology (ICT).
The paper is structured in ve sections. Section 2 describes and discusses some of the
ways in which employee power - and thus the willingness of rms to pay - will be a¤ected
by changes in ICT. In Section 3 we set up a formal model and derive some comparative
static results. Section 4 considers the stability of the di¤erent steady states, and section
5 summarizes the main conclusions.
2 ICT and monitoring
New ICT should not be seen as something that is simply plugged into organizations,
with the organizations otherwise unchanged. The use of new ICT is often tied up with
choices about larger changes in the organization of work. This paper is related to a large
empirical literature on the relationships between ICT, the organization of work, and power
(for instance, Drago 1996; Guy 2003; Hunter and Lafkas 2003; Ramirez et al 2007; Sewell
1998).
New technologies, and in particular ICTs, allow organizations to become exible, at,
decentralized, customer-oriented, and as a consequence to give employees increased discre-
tion. But not every employee who uses new ICTs has been given a charter for increased
decision making. ICTs facilitate increased exibility in the coordination of activity by
making it cheaper to gather information about, among other things, what employees do
(monitoring), and to ne tune the instructions given to employees. The industrial soci-
ology and human resource management literatures abound with examples of large classes
of employees, often in expanding parts of the economy such as wholesale and retail trade,
nancial services, hotels and restaurants, whose use of up to date ICTs is associated with
more detailed instruction sets and closer monitoring.
The process is complex, and it can be di¢ cult, even ex post, to sort out what is the net
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change in discretion for any particular employee. The use of the new technologies often
entails, or is associated with, signicant changes in the way organizations are managed
and individual jobs are structured. These changes are not easy to characterize, because
they take a number of di¤erent forms, and also because the rhetoric of organizational
transformation is not always a good guide to reality.
As an extreme case, assume for the moment that although ICTs improve, the task the
employee is asked to complete does not change. Improved monitoring may narrow the
scope of action open to a worker in two ways. One is that the manager has a better idea
of what the worker actually does. The other is that the manager has better information
about the environment in which the worker works, the options she faces and the e¤ect
that di¤erent actions the worker might take would have on completion of the task. In
other words, the manager has improved knowledge of both the workers actions, and the
state of nature in which those actions take place. For instance, prior to the 1980s a truck
drivers employer usually had only a vague idea of where he and the truck were. Now the
location of the truck, and even the behavior of its engine, are often tracked by satellite.
The drivers task may have changed little, but his scope for taking advantage of possible
slack in his schedule is diminished, and the employer has new information with which to
remove slack from the schedule over time.
Contrary to the assumption made above, tasks typically do change as part of the or-
ganizational transformations that go together with the introduction of new ICTs. In many
workplaces, for instance, workers who once had narrowly dened individual jobs now do
all or part of their work in teams; a worker may be expected to do a number of di¤erent
jobs within the team, and some teams are assigned problem-solving or decision-making
responsibilities which were not previously within the remit of employees at their level.
Such teamwork may enhance the scope of action open to a worker, both because of the
broadening of tasks (e.g., "problem solving") and because of what may be the greater
di¢ culty assigning individual accountability when actions are taken by teams. Changes
also occur in managerial work. The de-layering of organizations, and the competitive need
for organizations to be exible, give the remaining managers a greater range of decisions
to make. On the other hand, managers get monitored, too. It is tempting, especially
for those of us trained to recognize the beauty of markets as examples of spontaneous,
un-regimented order, to associate delegation, de-layering and decentralization as marketiz-
ation, the sunset of central control. But within organizations, decentralization is typically
facilitated by improved controls; the invention of the multi-divisional corporation in the
1920s, for instance, was made possible by improved cost accounting and management by
numbers(Chandler, 1962).
Our formal model below disregards these complications. It assumes symmetry across
workers and considers technical change that enhances the ability of managers to monitor
the actions of the rms workers. Implicitly the categories of (top) management and
capitalist are merged in the model. Managers may get increased discretion, but it is
assumed that they want to maximize prots and that there is no agency problem in the
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relation between capitalists and top managers.
3 Formal model
We use a standard e¢ ciency wage framework to analyze the e¤ects PBTC. The keep the
analysis simple, we assume price taking behavior in the product market and constant
returns scale. Labour is homogeneous and the production function is CES
Y = A(K  + (1  )(eN) ) 1= (1)
where e and N denote e¤ort and employment, and changes in the multiplicative constant
represent Hicks-neutral technical change. Leaving aside all issues of capital accumulation,
we shall take K to be constant throughout this paper.
Workerschoice of e¤ort is determined by the cost of job loss and the sensitivity of the
risk of job loss to variations in e¤ort.1 As a formal specication, we assume that if a rm
pays the wage w; the e¤ort of its workers may be determined by the maximization of the
objective function V ,
V = p(e)[w   v(e)  h( w; b; u)] (2)
where w; u and b denote the average wage, the unemployment rate and the rate of unem-
ployment benets. Arguably the choice of e¤ort should be determined by an optimization
problem that is explicitly intertemporal. As shown in Appendix A, however, a simple
intertemporal optimization model reduces to a special case of problem (2).
The function v(e) describes the disutility associated with e¤ort, and we assume a
log-linear functional form,
v(e) = e ;  > 1 (3)
This specication is quite standard, the parameter restriction  > 1 implying that given
the chosen scale of e¤ort, the disutility of e¤ort is strictly convex.2 The convexity assump-
tion ensures that the rms unit cost does not decrease monotonically as wages increase
and that, therefore, an equilibrium solution for w exists.
The function p(e) captures the e¤ect of e¤ort on the expected remaining duration of the
job; since high e¤ort reduces the risk of being red, we have p0 > 0. The e¤ect of technical
change on rmsability to monitor e¤ort may be represented by a shift in the p function.
The key property of this shift is that it a¤ects the sensitivity of the ring rate to variations
in e¤ort. An improvement in rmsability to monitor the e¤orts of individual workers
makes the expected job duration of any individual worker more sensitive to changes in the
1Most expositions of e¢ ciency wage models emphasize the former e¤ect, with the risk of job loss and
its dependence on e¤ort taken as exogenous; exceptions include Bowles (1985, 1988), Gintis and Ishikawa
(1987), and several subsequent joint papers by Bowles and Gintis.
2E¤ort is ordinal and the convexity assumption is conditional on the chosen scale. This scale is determ-
ined implicitly by the specication of the production function (Katzner and Skott (2004)).
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workers own e¤ort. This property of the p function can be captured by assuming that
the elasticity of p can be written
ep0
p
= (e; ) (4)
where the parameter  describes monitoring ability and  > 0. It should be noted that
equation (4) says nothing about the average ring rate and, as explained in appendix A,
the average ring rate may be una¤ected by a change in . Analytically, it is convenient
to assume that the elasticity  is independent of e,
ep0
p
= (e; ) =  (5)
This specication of the elasticity can be seen as a log-linear approximation of the p function
around the equilibrium solution for e.3
Using (2)-(3) and (5), the rst-order condition for the workers maximization problem
can be written
e = [

+ 
(w   h)]1= (6)
The wage is set by the rm. The standard rst order conditions imply that
eww
e
= 1
or, using (6),
1

w
w   h = 1
The solutions for the wage can now be written
w =

   1h (7)
The function h( w; b; u); nally, represents the fallback position, that is, the expected
utility in case of job loss; the partial derivatives satisfy h w > 0; hb > 0 and hu < 0 under all
standard assumptions. We use the specic functional form obtained from the optimization
model in Appendix A:
h =
(r + )u
ru+ 
b+
(1  u)
ru+ 
( w   v(e)) (8)
3 Integration of (5) implies that
p(e) = Ke
where K is an arbitrary constant. The intertemporal interpretation in Appendix A of workersmaxim-
isation problem implies that p(e) is bounded, unlike the above expression. Thus, the approximation will
be bad for largevalues of e. It may be good, however, for e¤ort levels in the relevant range, and all our
simulations below yield modest variations in e¤ort.
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where e is determined by setting e = e and w = w in equation (6); r and  are the discount
rate and the rate of job separations, respectively. Intuitively, the fallback position is a
weighted average of the utility when unemployed (b) and in an alternative job ( w  v(e)_):
The weights depend on u since (in a steady state) the unemployment rate is equal to the
proportion of time one can be expect to unemployed; if there is no discounting (r = 0) the
weights are simply u and 1   u but when r > 0; unemployment (the initial state in case
of job loss) is weighted more heavily.
Turning to the demand for labor, the rst-order condition for prot maximization
implies that the wage satises the equation
w = (1  )A(K  + (1  )(eN) ) (1+)=e N (1+)
= (1  )Ae[(1  ) + ( K
eN
) ] (1+)= (9)
In equilibrium, nally, w = w and e = e, and using the denitional relations between
unemployment u and employment N , equations (6)-(9) yield equilibrium solutions for the
endogenous variables (w; e;N; h):4
We now introduce a decline in the power of workers (a rise in ): Intuitively, this rise
puts upward pressure on e (equation (6)) and thus, for a given value of N; on the e¤ective
labor input eN . For a given ratio of relative inputs, eN=K; a rise in e will increase the wage
w (equation (9)), but w is a¤ected negatively if the upwards pressure on eN generates a
rise in the input ratio eN=K (equation (9)). This negative e¤ect is stronger the larger is
; that is, the lower the elasticity of substitution. Strong complementarity between the
inputs also implies that any rise in e tends to a¤ect N negatively. Thus, the elasticity of
substitution plays a critical role for the e¤ects of a change in relative power.
An example is given in Table 1.5 The rise in  leads to an improvement in both
wages and employment if A is unchanged. Given the assumptions in Appendix A, the
welfare of unemployed and employed workers can be measured by h(= rU) and j =
(w e) rr+ +h r+ (= rV ), respectively, and welfare also improves.6 This result may seem
counter-intuitive at rst sight but the explanation is straightforward. Agency problems
lead to outcomes that are Pareto suboptimal, and the increased ability of rms to monitor
e¤ort reduces the agency problem. Taking into account the derived e¤ects on employment
and wages, workers may therefore in some cases benet from a decline in their workplace
power. The interesting aspect of Table 1, however, is that when the rise in  from 0.1 to
0.5 is combined with a very substantial loss of technical e¢ ciency (a 15 percent fall in A
from 10 to 8.5) prots  still increase signicantly while workers su¤er a large reduction
4With inelastic labor supplies (normalized at unity), we have
u = 1 N
5The table uses  = 1: The other parameters are  = 0:5;  = 5; r = 0:05;  = 0:2;K = 1 and b = 1.
6The values of h are proportional to w (cf. equation (7)). A separate h column is included to facilitate
a comparison between the welfare measures for employed and unemployed workers.
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in wages and welfare. The negative e¤ect on prots of lower technical e¢ ciency is more
than compensated for by the decrease in workerspower and the associated changes in
e¤ort and wages.
Table 1 assumes that the elasticity of substitution in the production function is 0.5.
Complementarity may be the relevant case from an empirical perspective, but it should be
noted that complementarity is critical for the conclusion. Assuming prot maximization
and perfect competition in the product market, for instance, a Cobb-Douglas specication
implies that prots are a constant share of output, and it follows that if technological
change (a shift in A and/or ) generates an increase in prots then aggregate wages must
also go up.
Table 1: Equilibrium e¤ects of changes in monitoring
A  e w u h j 
10 0:1 0:45 4:91 0:21 3:93 4:12 1:40
10 0:5 0:63 5:53 0:19 4:42 4:62 2:29
8:5 0:5 0:61 4:68 0:20 3:75 3:91 1:83
4 Transition
The previous section looked at the comparative statics of a change in technique. The com-
parison of di¤erent equilibrium positions can be misleading, however. The congurations
underlying Table 1 imply not only that equilibrium prots increase following the change
in technique but also that the individual rm has an incentive to adopt the new technique
(see Table 3a below). It is easy, however, to nd examples of techniques that may yield
an increase in prots if all rms were to adopt them, even though no single rm has an
incentive to adopt the techniques. Conversely, individual rms may have an incentive to
introduce a new technique, even if the equilibrium prots when all rms introduce the
technique are lower than they would have been, had all rms kept the old technique.
Consider the decision problem of a single rm. The rms prots depend on the
technical parameters A and  as well as on its choice of wage and employment,
 = A(K  + (1  )(eN) ) 1=   wN
= Y (A;K; e;N)  wN (10)
= (A;K; e; w;N)
where
e = [

+ 
(w   h)]1=
= e(w; h; ) (11)
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For any given technique and capital stock (that is, A;;K) the rm chooses w and N so
that the rst-order conditions are satised:
@
@w
= eew  w = 0 (12)
@
@N
= 0 (13)
4.1 Marginal changes
Now assume that a new technique o¤ers a (marginal) change in both A and . Workers
fallback position is independent of the rms own choices so h is constant, and the e¤ect
on the rms optimal prots is given by
dpartial = AdA+e(ewdw + ed) + wdw +NdN
= AdA+eed
= YAdA+ Yeed
= Y [
YAA
Y
d logA+
Yee
Y
e
e
d log]
= Y [d logA+ L
1
+ 
d log] (14)
where the second equality comes from using the rst-order conditions (12)-(13) (or, equi-
valently, from the envelope theorem); the third equality comes from the denition of
prots in (10); L is the share of wages in income and L =
YNN
Y =
Yee
Y follows from prot
maximization.
Equation (14) implies that the rm has an incentive to introduce the new technique if
d log   + 
L
d logA (15)
The incentive depends on the wage share, and the wage share, in turn, depends on the
fallback position h. A rise in h implies an increase in w=e and a decline in eN=K (eqs. (6)-
(7)); and if  > 0 the decline in eN=K generates an increase in the wage share; if  < 0,
the wage share falls. Thus, although the single rm treats h as a constant, the incentives
that it faces depends on h: As long as the changes in technique are purely marginal this
dependence of the incentive condition on the level of h does not matter: if the change of
technique is marginal the associated change in h will also be marginal, and the level of L
can be taken as given. Thus, it follows from (15) that either all rms will adopt the new
technique or no rms will do it. When we consider non-marginal changes in technique
in the next subsection, however, the incentives will depend on whether other rms had
chosen to introduce the new technique.
Even with marginal changes in technique, the induced marginal e¤ects on the fallback
position h need to be taken into account in order to calculate the equilibrium e¤ects of
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changes in technique on the change in prots,
deq = AdA+e(ewdw + ed) + wdw +NdN +eehdh
= dpartial +eehdh
= Y [d logA+ L
1
+ 
d log] + eehdh (16)
Since e > 0 and eh < 0 (cf equation (11)), the sign of the last term is the opposite of that
of the change in the fallback position, dh. If dh is positive, then the single rms change of
technique produces a negative externality on the prots of all other rms; if dh is negative,
the externality is positive. The existence of this externality lies behind the possibility that
rmsindividually rational decisions may lead them to adopt a technique that reduces the
equilibrium level of prots. We illustrate this possibility in the next subsection which also
generalizes the setting by allowing for non-marginal changes in technique.
4.2 Non-marginal changes
With non-marginal technical changes, the fulllment of the incentive condition (15) for a
single rm may depend on the proportion of rms that have introduced the new technique.
Assume that workers cannot move directly from one job to another and that equilibrium
ring rates are the same in all jobs (this is consistent with di¤erences in monitoring, cf.
the argument in Appendix A) and let x denote the proportion of employed workers in
rms that use the new technique. With these assumptions, the fallback position h is given
by (see Appendix B)
h(x) = [x(wn(x)  v(en(x))) + (1  x)(wo(x)  v(eo(x))](1  u)
ru+ 
+ b
(r + )u
ru+ 
(17)
Equations (6), (7) and (9) still hold; the only di¤erence is that for each of them there will
now be two separate equations, one for the old and one for the new technique:
eo(x) = [
o
o + 
(wo(x)  h(x))]1= (18)
en(x) = [
n
n + 
(wn(x)  h(x))]1= (19)
wo(x) =

   1h(x) (20)
wn(x) =

   1h(x) (21)
wo(x) = 0:5 1=Aoe[1 + (
(1  z)K
eo(x)No
) ] (1+)= (22)
wn(x) = 0:5 1=Ane[1 + (
zK
en(x)Nn
) ] (1+)= (23)
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where z is the proportion of rms that have adopted the new technique; the proportion of
rms (z) and the proportion of the employment (x) will di¤er if, as will generally be case,
the new technique leads to a change in the capital labour ratio. By denition, nally, we
have
No = (1  x)(1  u) (24)
Nn = x(1  u) (25)
For any given value of x; equations (17)-(25) can solved for the nine variables wo; wn; eo; en;
No; Nn; h; u; z:
We get four qualitatively di¤erent possible outcomes for the equilibrium value x: (i)
x = 0; (ii) x = 1, (iii) 0 < x < 1, and (iv) multiple solutions with x = 0 or x = 1.
These possibilities as well as the externalities described above in the case of marginal
changes can be illustrated by the examples in Tables 2-5. All tables assume that a new
technique has become available and that this technique o¤ers better monitoring ( > 0)
but a lower productivity parameter (A < 0): The tables di¤er with respect to the precise
values of the changes in  and A as well as the values of other parameters.7
Table 2a: Neither micro incentive nor equilibrium increase in prots
(but workers would have benetted)
 =  0:5;  = 5;Aold = 10; old = 0:1;Anew = 8:5; new = 0:5
old new u w h jold jnew
x = 0:001 3:88 3:60 0:26 2:87 2:30 2:41 2:40
x = 0:999 3:80 3:51 0:24 3:01 2:41 2:524 2:516
Table 2b: No micro incentive but equilibrium increase in prots
(and workersutility would have dropped)
 = 1;  = 5;Aold = 10; old = 0:1;Anew = 7:5; new = 0:5
old new u w h jold jnew
x = 0:001 1:40 1:10 0:208 4:91 3:92 4:12 4:11
x = 0:999 1:97 1:54 0:207 4:12 2:30 2:41 2:40
Tables 2a-2b show examples in which no rm has an incentive to introduce the new
technique with improved monitoring, that is x = 0. In 2a the equilibrium prots would
7All tables use  = 0:5; Aold = 10; old = 0:1; r = 0:05;  = 0:2;K = 1; b = 1.
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decline with the introduction of the new technique while in 2b a positive externality im-
plies that even though there is no individual incentive to introduce the technique, the new
technique would in fact have generated an increase in aggregate prots. The key di¤er-
ence between the two scenarios is the elasticity of substitution in production. Increased
monitoring increases e¤ort at any given wage rate and thus tends to raise the ratio of
e¤ective labor (eN) to capital and/or reduce the employment-capital ratio (N=K). The
e¤ect of these changes on wages and employment depend on the elasticity of substitution.
When there is complementarity ( > 0), an increase in the e¤ective labor-capital ratio
reduces the wage share (and thus also wages and / or employment) with detrimental ef-
fect on workers fallback position; when the inputs are substitutes ( < 0), the rise in
the e¤ective labor - capital ratio raises the share of wages which tends to raise the fall-
back position. A deterioration in workersfallback position in turn represents a negative
prot externality while an improvement in the fallback position provides a positive prot
externality.
Table 3a: Both micro incentive and equilibrium increase in prots
(but workersutility declines)
 = 1;  = 5;Aold = 10; old = 0:1;Anew = 8:5; new = 0:5
old new u w h jold jnew
x = 0:001 1:40 1:69 0:21 4:91 3:93 4:12 4:11
x = 0:99 1:55 1:83 0:20 4:68 3:74 3:93 3:92
Table 3b: Micro incentive but equilibrium prots decrease
(and workersutility increase)
 =  0:5;  = 5;Aold = 10; old = 0:1;Anew = 9; new = 0:5
old new u w h jold jnew
x = 0:001 3:88 3:98 0:26 2:87 2:30 2:41 2:40
x = 0:99 3:71 3:74 0:23 3:20 2:56 2:69 2:68
In Tables 3a-3b rms introduce the new technique, and in 3a equilibrium prots go
up while in 3b the negative externality leads to a fall in prots. The scenario in Table 3b
illustrates a falling rate of prot. This violation of the Okishio theorem (Okishio, 1961) is
possible because - unlike the Okishio theorem - our analysis includes endogenous changes
in the unit wage cost via the e¢ ciency wage mechanism (other ways of introducing wage
changes in the analysis of the Marxian law of the falling rate of prot have been analyzed
by, inter alia, Foley (1986) and Skott (1991)).
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Table 4: Interior solution
 =  0:5;  = 5;Aold = 10; old = 0:1;Anew = 8:9; new = 0:5
old new u w h jold jnew
x = 0:001 3:88 3:90 0:26 2:87 2:30 2:41 2:40
x = 0:41 3:81 3:81 0:25 2:98 2:39 2:50 2:49
x = 0:99 3:72 3:69 0:23 3:16 2:53 2:65 2:64
Table 5: Multiple solutions
 =  0:1;  = 1:5;Aold = 10; old = 0:1;Anew = 4:3; new = 20
old new u w h jold jnew
x = 0:1 1:88 1:87 0:74 5:81 1:93 2:66 1:99
x = 0:9 2:07 2:11 0:49 4:04 1:35 1:85 1:39
Tables 4 and 5, nally, show the possibility of an interior solution and multiple equi-
libria, respectively. The interior solution in Table 4 is based on an assumption of good
substitutability ( < 0), but interior solutions can be obtained both in the case of com-
plementarity ( > 0) and in the case of substitutability ( < 0). The reason for this is
simple. When there is complementarity, an increase in the proportion of workers and rms
using the new technique will tend to reduce workers fallback position and when  > 0
this reduction in h generates a decline in workersshare of income; that is, the incentive
condition becomes more restrictive as x increases. When  < 0 an increase in x may
(but need not) increase h, but with  < 0 the wage share is negatively related to h and a
decline in the wage share is obtained in this case too.
Multiple solutions are harder to get. In order to get multiple solutions it is assumed in
Table 5 that the new technique provides a very dramatic increase in monitoring (new =
20) and that the elasticity of worker utility with respect to e¤ort is low ( = 1:5). As
a result, the value of a job using the old technique is much higher than that associated
with a job using the new technique (jold >> jnew). Even though an increase in the
proportion of new jobs generates an increase in employment, the employment e¤ect is
kept relatively small by using a negative but numerically small value of . The welfare
e¤ects of the changing composition of the jobs therefore dominates, and workers su¤er a
net welfare loss as the proportion of jobs using of the new technique goes up. Since good
substitutability is assumed ( < 0) the decline in h generates an increase in the wage
share, and the incentive condition (15) is relaxed as x increases.
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5 Conclusions
ICT has a monitoring function, but the adoption of new ICT has often facilitated organiz-
ational changes which go far beyond changes in monitoring. The telegraph, the telephone,
and a host of other technologies made it feasible to coordinate elaborate planned divisions
of labor involving hundreds of thousands of employees in big corporations, and tens of
millions in the planned economy of the Soviet Union. The rigid bureaucratic structures
for which the mid twentieth century was known were a reection of the ICTs of the day.
Microprocessors and other, more recent, developments in ICT have made possible more
exible systems. Whether with regard to sweeping organizational changes such as these, or
narrower changes in particular jobs or functions, the adoption of new ICT brings changes
in the organization of work as well.
In this paper we have considered the implications of changes that give (top) managers
increased discretion and allow them to monitor the actions of employees more closely.
Changes of this kind may increase the discretion for managers while constraining the
ability of (many or most) employees to make consequential choices for the organization.
Discretion and its inverse, constraint, develop hand in hand.
Our analysis shows that if the same information technologies which allow the managers
to prepare more accurate plans and to correct errors more quickly also enable the manager
to monitor workers more closely, then we may see a polarization of incomes with workers
losing out and increases in prots and managerial incomes.
One limitation of the model is the aggregation of prots and the income of top man-
agers. With the explosion in managerial remuneration, however, the split between these
two categories has changed signicantly,. and by aggregating the two we leave out agency
problems in the relation between managers and owners. It is unclear how this may bias our
analysis of the choice of technique, but since the choice of technique is made by managers,
the alternative assumption that only narrow prots (that exclude managerial remunera-
tion) inuence the choice of technique would probably represent a more serious distortion
than our hybrid assumption.
The assumption of complete symmetry across all (non-managerial) workers represents
another gross simplication. In fact, power-biased technical change may have been a
signicant factor, not just behind the increase in the share of broad prots but also
behind increased inequality among workers (Guy and Skott 2005; Skott and Guy 2006).
Other obvious limitations of the model concern (i) the absence of any consideration of
capital accumulation when, in fact, it is hard to conceive of technical change without
investment; (ii) the focus on steady states and the assumption that workers and rms
have full knowledge of the various parameters underlying workers choice of e¤ort; (iii)
the assumption that the choice takes place over some exogenously given techniques rather
than allowing for decisions over how to allocate R&D resources and where to search for
new techniques.
These simplications clearly make the analysis much more tractable and relaxing the
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assumptions would not, we believe, invalidate the fundamental mechanism that is the focus
of this paper: the pursuit of prots by private enterprise a¤ects the choice of technique,8
and technically ine¢ cient production methods may be chosen if they enable rms to
squeeze workers. But the analysis also shows that micro incentives and class interests do
not always go together: the prot incentive will not invariably lead rms to choose the
technique that gives the highest equilibrium level of prots.
Technical change typically produces losers as well as winners, also in a Walrasian
world without agency problems. In the absence of agency problems, however, there is
a presumption that, in principle, the winners could compensate the losers, leaving a net
gain. There is no basis for the presumption of welfare improvements in the case of power-
biased technical changes. A new technique can be protable and may be adopted even if
it is less e¢ cient than existing techniques.
One nal comment may be called for. We have analyzed the PBTC hypothesis using
a traditional e¢ ciency wage model as it applies to individual wage determination. This
model, arguably, provides a good approximation of wage setting in the US, UK, and
other liberal market economies (using this term in the sense employed by Hall and Soskice
(2001)). The model may be less appropriate, however, for countries in which wage bargains
are more likely to be collective. Unions, moreover, inuence working conditions as well as
wages. Thus, there is evidence that the presence of strong unions reduces the impact of
the cost of job loss on e¤ort (Green and McIntosh, 1998), and among European countries
there is a correlation between loss of union power and the rate of work intensication
(Green and McIntosh, 2001).
If the PBTC hypothesis is true, in the - admittedly extreme - case in which e¤ort
levels are set and controlled by unions there are no agency problems between rms and
workers: from a single rms perspective, e¤ort is exogenously given. Having e¤ort levels
exogenously determined, moreover, does not block technological progress; it merely weeds
out those changes of technique that are protable only because of work intensication. But
if technical progress has been mainly of a power-biased and technically ine¢ cient kind since
the late 1970s, then one would expect di¤erences between liberal market economies and
economies in which collective bargaining over wages plays an important role: over this
period the liberal market economies would be experiencing faster measured productivity
growth but also a stronger tendencies toward work intensication and income inequality.
This prediction appears to be consistent with the evidence from the last 30 years.
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6 Appendices
6.1 Appendix A: Intertemporal optimization
Consider an innitely lived agent with instantaneous utility function
u(c; e) = c  v(e)
Assume that the interest rate r is equal to the discount rate. The time prole of consump-
tion is then a matter of indi¤erence to the agent, and we may assume that consumption
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matches current income. If U denotes the value function of an unemployed worker, a
worker who is currently employed at a wage w faces an optimization problem that can be
written
maxE[
TZ
0
(w   v(e)) exp( rt) dt+ exp( rT ) U ]
where the stochastic variable T denotes the time that the worker loses the job. Assuming
a constant hazard rate, T is exponentially distributed. In a steady state the objective
function can be rewritten
E[
TZ
0
(w   v(e)) exp( rt) dt+ exp( rT ) U ] = E
TZ
0
(w   v(e)  h) exp( rt) dt+ U
= E(
w   v(e)  h
r
(1  exp( rT )) + U
= (w   v(e)  h)p+ U
where h = rU and p = E(1  exp( rT ))=r = (1  r+ )=r = 1r+ is an increasing function
of the rate of separations . E¤ort a¤ects the ring probability and thus the rate of
separations, so the workers rst order condition can be written
 v0(e)p(e) + (w   v(e)  h)p0(e) = 0
The value function for an unemployed worker will depend on the average level of wages, the
rate of unemployment benets and the hiring rate. With a constant rate of unemployment,
the hiring rate q is proportional to the average rate of separations
q = 
L
N   L =

1  u
u
where u is the unemployment rate and  is the average rate of separations. The risk of
job loss gives an incentive for workers to provide e¤ort. But an increased average ring
rate does not help the rm unless it raises e¤ort (on the contrary, high labor turnover is
usually costly). Since e¤ort is determined by the semi-elasticity p0=p (see the rst order
condition) it follows that the average ring rate in the economy need not be related to the
average level of e¤ort and, secondly, that an improved ability to detect individual e¤ort -
a rise in p0=p - may change the average (standard) e¤ort but need not be associated with
any changes in the ring rate for workers that meet this changed standard. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that  is constant. But since average e¤ort is itself determined by
w; b and u, whether or not  depends on e, we have
h = h( w; b; u)
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In equilibrium, w = w and in order to nd the value of h we note that
V   U = (w   h  v(e))p (A1)
U   V = (b  rV )s = fb  r[(w   h  v(e))p+ h
r
]gs (A2)
where s = E(1 exp( rTu)r ) and the stochastic variable Tu denotes the remaining length
of the spell of unemployment of a currently unemployed worker. With a constant rate of
separations, random hiring and constant unemployment, the stochastic variable Tu follows
an exponential distribution with expected value ETu = u1 uET where ET = 1= is the
average expected remaining duration of employment for an employed worker. Using (A1)-
(A2) and the expressions for p and s (p = 1=(r + ); s = 1=(r + (1   u)=u))), it follows
that
h = (w   v(e)) p  rps
p+ s  rps + b
s
p+ s  rps
= (w   v(e))(1  u)
ru+ 
+ b
(r + )u
ru+ 
Thus, the fallback position is a weighted average of the utility ows while employed and
unemployed with the weights depending on the rate of unemployment.
6.2 Appendix B
Let x be the proportion of employed workers in rms that use the new technique, and
assume (i) that workers cannot move directly from one job to another and that (ii) equilib-
rium ring rates are the same in all jobs (this is consistent with di¤erences in monitoring,
cf. the argument in Appendix A). Proceeding along the same lines as in Appendix A, the
value function for workers in rms using the old and the new technique are then given,
respectively, by
V o(x) = (wo(x)  h(x)  v(eo(x)))p+ U(x)
V n(x) = (wn(x)  h(x)  v(en(x)))p+ U(x)
where
p =
1
r + 
In a steady state the value function for an unemployed worker can be written
U(x) = E[
TuZ
0
b exp( rt) dt+ exp( rTu) V (x)]
= E[
b  rV (x)
r
(1  exp( rT )] + V (x)
= (b  rV (x))s+ V (x)
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where
V (x) = xV n(x) + (1  x)V o(x)
= [x(wn(x)  v(en(x))) + (1  x)(wo(x)  v(eo(x))]p  h(x)p+ U(x)
and
s = E(
1  exp( rTu)
r
)
= 1=(r + (1  u)=u))
Hence,
h(x) = [x(wn(x)  v(en(x))) + (1  x)(wo(x)  v(eo(x))](1  u)
ru+ 
+ b
(r + )u
ru+ 
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